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Tricky business: Swiss perceptions of informal imperialism in China in
the 1920s
Ariane KNÜSEL*
Forschungsstelle für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, University of Zurich, Zurich
This article analyzes the role that commercial interests played in Swiss perceptions of
informal imperialism in China during the 1920s. Commercial interests were the driving
force behind the establishment of Swiss relations with China in 1918 and Swiss rejec-
tions of Chinese demands to abolish extraterritoriality in the 1920s. Swiss commercial
relations with China were deeply rooted in the social, economic, and political institutions
and processes developed by informal imperialism in China. During the Chinese anti-
foreign agitation in the 1920s, the Swiss press criticized the unequal treaties as an
example of imperialism in China but ignored Switzerland’s participation in it. This
discrepancy between the official and media perceptions of Swiss commercial interests
in China was caused by the fact that Switzerland’s dependence on privileges connected
to the unequal treaties clashed with Swiss national mythology, which was based on
neutrality and anti-imperial narratives. Moreover, the negligible importance attributed to
Swiss trade with China and the increasing focus on the nationality of foreign companies
in China allowed the Swiss media to ignore Swiss commercial interests in China. As a
result, Swiss complicity in informal imperialism was downplayed by the Swiss press,
which ignored the importance of Swiss commerce to Sino–Swiss relations.
Keywords: unequal treaties; China; Switzerland; extraterritoriality; informal imperialism;
press; commercial interests
On June 7, 1925, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), the most important liberal daily
newspaper in Switzerland, printed an article about the antiforeign movement in China.
The article described how foreigners controlled the police force and courts in large parts
of Shanghai, despite the fact that they only formed a tiny fraction of Shanghai’s popula-
tion. It criticized extraterritoriality as having been forced upon China by the foreign
powers and described the situation as “very problematic.”1 Two weeks later, the NZZ
printed another article in which it argued:
[The cause of the current conflict] can ultimately be found in the fact that the foreigners in all the
Chinese treaty ports enjoy large and important privileges compared to the Chinese, and these
privileges have risen in some ‘concessionary areas’ to full-fledged judicial extraterritoriality.2
The NZZ argued emphatically that the only way the situation could be improved in the
long term was if the foreign powers relinquished their obsolete privileges, extraterritori-
ality, and the concessions, which had been forced upon China with brutal violence. If this
*Email: ariane.knuesel@uzh.ch
1 Neue Zürcher Zeitung (hereafter NZZ), June 7, 1925.
2 NZZ, June 21, 1925.
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was not done, the article warned, China would resort to brutal violence until the powers
gave up their privileges.3
Such a critical view of the privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China is not what one would
expect from the most prominent newspaper advocating Swiss trade in China. Swiss commer-
cial interests were not mentioned and neither were the views of Swiss companies and
businessmen about extraterritoriality. Yet, as this article will demonstrate, commercial inter-
ests in China were the driving force behind both the establishment of Swiss relations with
China and Swiss rejections of Chinese demands to abolish extraterritoriality in the 1920s.
During the Chinese antiforeign agitation in the 1920s, most Swiss newspapers and
magazines harshly criticized the unequal treaties as an example of imperialism in China,
seemingly oblivious to the fact that extraterritoriality was of huge importance for the
Swiss government and for Swiss businessmen in China.4 By analyzing the discrepancy
between the Swiss government’s insistence on Switzerland’s status as a power with
extraterritoriality in China and the Swiss media’s criticism of the unequal treaties, this
article demonstrates that commercial interests played a crucial part in this problem
because of their connection to the unequal treaties in China.
This article follows John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s definition of informal imperi-
alism to describe the political and economic control that was achieved by the foreign powers
in China through gunboat diplomacy, trade, loans, and investment.5 Beginning with the Treaty
of Nanjing in 1842, the unequal treaties that were forced upon China gave foreign nations
privileges such as extraterritoriality, control over territorial enclaves, administrative control
over revenue-collecting agencies, a customs tariff rate of 5 percent ad valorem, the right for
missionaries to proselytize and establish schools and universities, and the right to station
troops in China. Nevertheless, as Jürgen Osterhammel has pointed out, each power’s imperial
presence in China had specific sectoral, institutional, spatial, and diachronic dimensions.6
While Chinese foreign relations in the 1920s and the issue of the unequal treaties have been
analyzed in detail,7 the case of Switzerland adds a new dimension to this subject by showing
that the issue of commercial interests in China and their dependence on privileges connected
to the unequal treaties were extremely problematic for a neutral country.
This article is structured in four parts, namely (1) the influence of Swiss economic
interests on diplomatic relations with China until the early 1920s, (2) the antiforeign
agitation in China and its effects on Swiss commerce, (3) media portrayals of Swiss
interests in China during the antiforeign agitation in the 1920s, and (4) reasons for the
discrepancy between the importance of commerce in political relations and media por-
trayals. The article focuses on the period 1923–1927 because by 1928 most antiforeign
agitation had subsided, and the Nanjing Government under Chiang Kai-shek had been
3 NZZ, June 21, 1925.
4 Knüsel, Framing China, 117–125.
5 Gallagher and Robinson, “Imperialism of Free Trade,” 1–15. For critics of Robinson and
Gallagher, see Louis, Imperialism.
6 There is no agreement about the definition of the term “unequal treaties” or the specific number of
unequal treaties that were made between China and the foreign powers. SeeWang, “Discourse of Unequal
Treaties,” 400–402, 418–419; Fung, “Chinese Nationalists,” 795–798; Osterhammel, “Semi-Colonialism
and Informal Empire,” 290–314; and Mclean, “Finance and ‘Informal Empire,’” 291–305.
7 Fung, “Chinese Nationalists”; Murdock, “Exploiting Anti-Imperialism,” 65–95; Kirby, “The
Internationalization of China,” 433–458; Wang, “Discourse of Unequal Treaties”; Zhou,
Exterritorialitätsrechte; Rigby, May 30 Movement; Ku, “Urban Mass Movement,” 197–216;
Osterhammel, Shanghai; Ristaino, China’s Art of Revolution; Leutner et al., The Chinese
Revolution; Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution; Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain; and Clifford,
Spoilt Children of Empire.
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established, which adopted a different policy against the foreign powers, focusing more on
tariff control than on extraterritoriality.8
I. Commercial interests and Sino–Swiss relations
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, economic organizations exerted a
profound influence on Swiss politics. As a consequence, Swiss foreign relations were
greatly influenced by the interests of the Swiss export industry.9 This can also be observed
in the decisive role that commercial interests played in Sino–Swiss relations. An official
Swiss trading agency was established in Shanghai in 1912 after consistent lobbying by
Swiss business organizations, which argued that a Swiss commercial emissary was
necessary to negotiate or mediate business transactions in order to boost Swiss trade
with China.10 In 1914, the Swiss Federal Council toyed with the idea of closing the
agency. However, Swiss business organizations and the Swiss representative in Tokyo,
Ferdinand von Salis, intervened, and the Federal Council agreed to open a consulate in
China after the First World War. Negotiations between Switzerland and China began in
1917, and in 1918 a treaty of friendship between Switzerland and the Republic of China
was signed.11
As the Chinese government urgently wanted a mission in Switzerland, it was willing
to include an annex in the treaty that granted Switzerland the most-favored-nation clause
with respect to extraterritoriality. Switzerland in return promised to relinquish extraterri-
toriality once China had reformed its judicial system. The most-favored-nation clause also
entitled Swiss merchants to pay a tariff of only 5 percent on Swiss goods exported to
China.12 In her study of Swiss extraterritoriality in China, Yufang Zhou argues that the
Sino–Swiss treaty could be classified from a legal point of view as an unequal treaty.
However, Zhou also points out that Swiss privileges did not extend to the same degree as
those of Britain, France, and some of the other foreign nations. For example, Switzerland
had no concessions in China and no troops stationed there.13
Anti-imperial nationalism had existed in China since the late nineteenth century,14
but it received a boost after the First World War, when the abolition of the unequal
treaties became the focus of Chinese nationalism. At the Peace Conference in
Versailles in 1919, Chinese delegates tried in vain to achieve the abolition of extra-
territoriality and the uniform tariff. During the Washington Conference (1921–1922),
8 Fung, “Chinese Nationalists,” 808–809.
9 Müller, “Einleitung,” 333; Schmid, Wirtschaft, 83–85; and Witschi, Schweizer auf imperialis-
tischen Pfaden, 188–192.
10 Max Huber, “Bericht über die Möglichkeit der Förderung schweizerischen Exports nach China,”
November 1901, Feder Archives, Berne, Switzerland (hereafter BAR) E 2001 A 1000/45 978;
“Schreiben des Handelsdepartements an den Bundesrat,” December 6, 1911, BAR E 2001 A 1000/
45 1350; “Auszug aus dem Protokoll der Sitzung des Schweizerischen Bundesrates,” July 10, 1914,
BAR E 2001 A 1000/45; Journal de Genève, February 4, 1912; and Berner Intelligenzblatt,
December 21, 1911. See also: Zhou, Exterritorialitätsrechte, 49–50; and Steinmann, Seldwyla im
Wunderland, 72–73.
11 “Protokoll der Sitzung des Schweizerischen Bundesrates”, January 20, 1914, BAR E 2001A 1000/
45 1055; “Auszug aus dem Protokoll der Sitzung des Schweizerischen Bundesrates”, July 10, 1914,
BAR E 2001 A 1000/45 1350. See also: Zhou, Exterritorialitätsrechte, 81–97.
12 “Der Chef der Abteilung für Auswärtiges des Politischen Departementes, P. Dinichert, an den
schweizerischen Geschäftsträger in Washington, Gesandtschaftssekretär A. Girardet,” August 12,
1925, in Commission nationale pour la publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 80–81.
13 Zhou, Exterritorialitätsrechte, 105–106.
14 Osterhammel, Shanghai, 115.
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the unequal treaties were also described as unjust by Chinese delegates, but instead of
abrogating extraterritoriality, the Nine Power Treaty of March 6, 1922 confirmed the
Open Door Policy and only stated that extraterritoriality would eventually be
abolished.15
The increasing importance that the Chinese government placed upon the abrogation of the
unequal treaties in the early 1920s affected relations between Switzerland and China. Since
extraterritoriality was only mentioned in the appendix to the Sino–Swiss treaty of friendship,
Switzerland was excluded from the Washington Conference and later from the Customs Tariff
Conference.16 Moreover, in 1923, the Chinese parliament reviewed the treaty of friendship
between Switzerland and China but rejected consular jurisdiction for Switzerland, which had
been in effect since Switzerland had opened its Consulate General in Shanghai in 1921.17 This
was fairly typical of the Chinese government’s behavior towards the foreign powers after the
Washington Conference, because the Chinese government decided against taking on all foreign
powers at once and instead tried to persuade individual powers to renegotiate treaties, claiming
that they were invalid. The treaty with Switzerland seems to have been singled out for particular
scrutiny by the Chinese government because it was China’s last treaty that granted consular
jurisdiction and extraterritoriality.18
The Swiss government rejected China’s demands for renegotiation in 1924 and the
Swiss Consul General, Johan Lukas Isler, continued to administer justice in Shanghai.
Nevertheless, the Chinese demands for treaty revision were taken so seriously in
Berne that in 1925 the Head of the Division of Foreign Affairs, Paul Dinichert,
ordered the Swiss Minister in Paris, Alphonse Dunant, to ask the French government
as a precautionary measure if it would be willing to protect Swiss nationals in China
in case the Chinese government actually hindered Swiss consuls in Shanghai and
Canton from administering justice.19 After the French government replied that it
would not be able to do so for all Swiss nationals in China, the Division of Foreign
Affairs asked the Swiss representative in Berlin, Hermann Karl Rüfenacht, about the
German experience of giving up extraterritoriality in China and having to rely on
Chinese tribunals. Rüfenacht’s report was fairly positive and was promptly forwarded
15 “Der Verweser des schweizerischen Generalkonsulates in Shanghai, F. Kästli, an den Chef der
Abteilung für Auswärtiges des Politischen Departementes, P. Dinichert,” August 4, 1925, BAR E
2001 (C) 1/18, Commission nationale pour la publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses,
121–122. See also: Fung, “Chinese Nationalists”; Buckley, The United States; Wright, “The
Washington Conference”; and Miller, Populist Nationalism, 109–110, 127–139.
16 “Der Verweser des schweizerischen Generalkonsulates in Shanghai, F. Kästli, an den Chef der
Abteilung für Auswärtiges des Politischen Departementes, P. Dinichert,” August 4, 1925,
Commission nationale pour la publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 121–122. See
also Zhou, Exterritorialitätsrechte, 118, 126–129.
17 “Der Chef der Abteilung für Auswärtiges des Politischen Departementes, P. Dinichert, an den
schweizerischen Gesandten in Paris, A. Dunant,” March 13, 1925, Commission nationale pour la
publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisse, 25–27.
18 “Der schweizerische Gesandte in Paris, A. Dunant, an den Vorsteher des Politischen
Departementes, G. Motta,” March 17, 1925, BAR E 2001 (B) 6/5, Commission nationale pour la
publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 30.
19 “Der Chef der Abteilung für Auswärtiges des Politischen Departementes, P. Dinichert, an den
schweizerischen Gesandten in Paris, A. Dunant,” March 13, 1925, Commission nationale pour la
publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 25–27; and “Der chinesische Gesandte in Bern,
Tsent-Tsiang Lou, an den Vorsteher des Politischen Departementes, G. Motta,” February 7, 1925,
Commission nationale pour la publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 12–13.
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to Isler in Shanghai for his opinion on the matter.20 However, Isler flat out rejected
any changes, claiming that China had neither a constitutional government nor a
parliament and that Chinese courts were incapable of administering justice according
to modern law.21
Interestingly, the issue of trade figured prominently in Isler’s reply. The consul general
stated emphatically that the abolition of extraterritoriality would have a negative effect on
Swiss commerce with China, pointing out that extraterritoriality had been crucial for the
development of Swiss commerce in China because it had settled the previously uncertain
position of Swiss merchants. Isler concluded:
For the development of Swiss commerce and the security of its agents, the continuation of
extraterritoriality is a primordial advantage, and I do not hesitate at all to say that, with the
exception of a few missionaries who have other interests, all our compatriots in China oppose
energetically any modification of the existing state.22
Isler’s reply is surprising given the insignificant role that the China market played for the
Swiss economy. Between 1919 and 1927, imports from China amounted to less than 0.7
percent of total Swiss imports and exports to China to less than 1.6 percent of total Swiss
exports (see Figure 1). The most important Swiss exports to China included pocket
watches and wristwatches, indigo, silk, and satin stitch embroidery. These were typical
of Switzerland’s exports in the 1920s, with watches and products from the chemical
industry as leading export products, followed by textiles and machines.23
Figure 1. Swiss trade with China as percentage of total Swiss trade, 1919–1927.24
20 “Der schweizerische Gesandte in Paris, A. Dunant, an den Vorsteher des Politischen
Departementes, G. Motta,” March 17, 1925, BAR E 2001 (B) 6/5, Commission nationale pour la
publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 30; and “Der Chef der Abteilung für Auswärtiges
des Politischen Departementes, P. Dinichert, an den schweizerischen Generalkonsul in Shanghai, J.
L. Isler,” April 28, 1925, Commission nationale pour la publication de Documents Diplomatiques
Suisses, 50–51.
21 “Der schweizerische Generalkonsul in Shanghai, J. L. Isler, an den Chef der Abteilung für
Auswärtiges des Politischen Departementes, P. Dinichert,” July 14, 1925, Commission nationale
pour la publication de Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 104–106.
22 Ibid.
23 Müller, “Einleitung,” 322–323.
24 Data taken from: Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1919;
Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1920; Eidgenössische
Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1921; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik
des Warenverkehrs 1922; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1923;
Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1924; Eidgenössische
Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1925; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik
des Warenverkehrs 1926; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1927.
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A series of reports written by Friedrich Kästli, a member of the staff of the Swiss
Consulate in Shanghai, reveals how the consulate tried to foster Swiss commercial interests
in China in the 1920s. In 1923, Kästli wrote seven reports for Swiss companies interested in
doing business in China. The reports were written for publication in the Schweizerisches
Handelsamtsblatt, the official publication of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs’
Division of Trade. In the reports, Kästli explained that business in China was different from
that in other countries and gave detailed advice on the successful organization of a business
venture in China. Kästli often referred to the Chinese in the reports using the singular label
“der Chinese”, which carries a similar meaning to “the Chinaman”. This derogatory label
was common because of the Orientalist perspective pervasive amongst foreigners in
China.25 Nevertheless, it is striking because Kästli referred to other nationals in the plural,
only the Chinese were described in the singular, implying that all Chinese could be reduced
to specific characteristics. The focus on the cultural and/or racial difference of the Chinese
can also be seen in various references in Kästli’s reports on the inferior Chinese intellectual
capacity as compared to that of foreigners. For example, Kästli repeatedly suggested that
companies send actual models of their goods to China, not just catalogues or pamphlets with
illustrations of them, since “plain brochures are of little use for the Chinaman because he can
neither understand the illustrations nor the text, particularly if the latter are in English.”26
The consulate also actively supported Swiss companies exporting goods to China by
publishing bulletins in which it sought agents for such products as watches, machinery,
chemical and pharmaceutical products, and even such famously Swiss staples as chocolate
or “Gruyere cheese (without crust) in cardboard boxes and tins.”27 By 1924, however,
Kästli’s reports about Swiss trade with China had grown increasingly glum because of the
ongoing fighting between the various Chinese warlords. In September 1924, Kästli noted
rather dejectedly:
It is evident that the business situation is suffering seriously from the consequences of the
current civil war […] new orders are practically impossible to obtain and if the Chinese have
any opportunity to cancel existing orders under any pretence or refuse arriving goods, they
will not let this opportunity pass by.28
II. Chinese antiforeign agitation and Swiss trade
As Kästli increasingly saw his hopes for Swiss trade in China dashed, the situation
deteriorated even further once the May Thirtieth Movement broke out. In the mid-
25 For Orientalism see Said, Orientalism.
26 Kästli, “Zur wirtschaftlichen Erschliessung Chinas. (Organisation und Technik des Imports nach
China),” June E 1923, BAR E 2300 1000/716_431 (quote); Kästli, untitled report, January 22, 1923,
BAR E 2300 1000/716_431; Kästli, “Zur Wirtschaftlichen Erschliessung Chinas. (Die
Waehrungsverhaeltnisse in China),” February 1923, BAR E 2300 1000/716_431; Kästli, “Zur
wirtschaftlichen Erschliessung Chinas. (Die Finanzlage der Chinesischen Republik),” March 1923,
BAR E 2300 1000/716_431; Kästli, “Zur wirtschaftlichen Erschliessung Chinas. Der Uhrenmarkt in
China,” April 1923, BAR E 2300 1000/716_431; Kästli, “Zur Wirtschaftlichen Erschliessung
Chinas. (Organisation und Technik des Imports nach China),” undated (1923), BAR E 2300
1000/716_431; and Kästli, “Zur Wirtschaftlichen Erschliessung Chinas. (Organisation und
Technik des Imports nach China),” December 1923, BAR E 2300 1000/716_431.
27 Swiss Consulate Shanghai, Bulletins from April 1923, October 1923, and March 1924 (quote),
BAR E 2300 1000/716_431.
28 Kästli, “Vertraulicher Bericht ueber die politischen, militaerischen und wirtschaftlichen Zustaende
in der Republik China waehrend des Buergerkrieges 1924,” September 1924, BAR E 2300 1000/
716_431.
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1920s, various political actors and groups utilized the unequal treaties to legitimize
their political ambitions and to mobilize the Chinese population. These groups
included the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party, which formed
a United Front between 1924 and 1927.29 In the early 1920s, antiforeign agitation was
mostly limited to demonstrations and strikes in foreign-owned textile factories. In June
1925, however, the May Thirtieth Movement unleashed a wave of riots, boycotts of
foreign goods, and strikes and demonstrations against the foreign powers and the
unequal treaties across China.30
The May Thirtieth Movement broke out in Shanghai, which had been opened to
foreign trade as a treaty port in 1842. Informal imperialism in Shanghai led to a situation
described by Jürgen Osterhammel as imperium in imperio (state within a state).31
Although foreigners represented only 3.5 percent of the population in Shanghai’s
French Concession and the International Settlement, all nine members of the Shanghai
Municipal Council (SMC) were foreigners. The SMC formulated its own laws and
taxes, and it had its own police force and court.32 After the outbreak of the May
Thirtieth Movement, negotiations between demonstrators and the SMC focused on the
abrogation of the privileges connected to the unequal treaties and resulted in the
agreement that Shanghai’s Mixed Court was to be abolished by the end of 1926 and
that three seats on the SMC were to be reserved for Chinese councilors. The foreign
powers also agreed to restore control over the customs to China by January 1929.
Extraterritoriality and other privileges of foreigners in China, however, remained
intact.33
By 1927, antiforeign agitation orchestrated by the GMD and the Chinese Communist
Party as well as Comintern agents had caused relations between the GMD and the foreign
powers to deteriorate to such a degree that Chiang Kai-shek organized a coup in April 1927.
This severely weakened leftwing leaders of the GMD’s Central Executive Committee in
Wuhan who continued to call for anti-imperial agitation and unilateral abrogation of the
unequal treaties. The coup also resulted in the arrest, torture, and execution of thousands of
alleged Communists across China. Chiang established the Nationalist government in
Nanjing and expelled the Communists from the GMD in July 1927.34
29 “ECCI Resolution on the Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang,”
in Degras, The Communist International, 5–6. See also: Wang, “Discourse of Unequal Treaties”;
Elleman, “Soviet Diplomacy,” 450–480; Murdock, “Exploiting Anti-Imperialism,” 69–88; Fung,
“Chinese Nationalists,” 799–800; Luk, Origins of Chinese Bolshevism; and Wilbur, The Nationalist
Revolution, 5–14.
30Documents on the Shanghai Case; “Report on the Hong Kong–Canton Strike, March 1926,” in
Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution, 594–596; Woodhead, China Year Book 1926–7, 268;
and Woodhead, China Yearbook 1928, 942–951, 965. See also: Murdock, “Exploiting Anti-
Imperialism”; Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain, 5 and 13–14; Rigby, The May 30 Movement; Ku,
“Urban Mass Movement,” 197–203, 207; Osterhammel, Shanghai, 12–18; Wilbur, The Nationalist
Revolution, 21–23; and Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, 9–10.
31 Osterhammel, Shanghai, 9.
32 Ibid., 7–12; Bickers, “Shanghailanders,” 168–169; Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, 21–22;
and Lockwood, “International Settlement at Shanghai,” 1033–1034.
33 Osterhammel, Shanghai, 18–22.
34 Woodhead, China Year Book 1928, 723–725; Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution;
Manchester Guardian, April 12, 14, 1927; The Times (London), April 7, 1927. See also: Wilbur,
The Nationalist Revolution, 92, 96–97, 103–111; Martin, “The Green Gang,” 64–92; Trampedach,
“Chiang Kaishek,” 128–132; and Fung, “Chinese Nationalists,” 803–804.
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While the antiforeign agitation in China between 1925 and 1927 had a devastating
effect on trade with countries like Britain,36 it did not greatly affect Swiss trade with
China. Although exports in 1925 amounted to CHF 7,507,000 less than the previous year
(exports in 1924 to China totaled CHF 32,975,000 and in 1925 totaled CHF 25,468,000),
they did not fall further (see Figure 2).37 Swiss exports to China suffered mainly because
less indigo was exported to China. As many textile factory workers went on strike and
British factories had problems selling their wares because of the boycott, there was less
demand for indigo, which was used for coloring textiles.
The export of watches to China also dropped drastically after 1924. Despite Kästli’s
claim in 1923 that 99 percent of the Chinese were illiterate and had no use for dials,
watches were among the best-selling Swiss products in China. Swiss companies exported
gold, nickel, and silver pocket and wristwatches to China. Most people who bought the
expensive watches were foreigners living in China because the large majority of Chinese
could not afford them, opting instead for cheap nickel watches.38 Since many businesses
incurred serious losses during the boycott, fewer people would have had the money to buy
those watches.
Overall, Swiss imports from China continued to rise between 1924 and 1927, but there
were some exceptions. Imports from China were dominated by textile materials, primarily
silk. While the May Thirtieth Movement included strikes in textile factories, Swiss
imports from China decreased only slightly in 1926 and increased again in 1927.
Foodstuff imports from China, however, decreased in 1925 and 1926 and only reached
Figure 2. Swiss exports to China in Swiss francs, 1923–1927.35
35 Remer and Palmer, Study of Chinese Boycotts, 111–113, 119–122, 127; Woodhead, China Year
Book 1928, 900; Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, 44–89; Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain, 18;
Rigby, The May 30 Movement, 142–146; and See, “Alone against the Waking Dragon,” 175–176.
36 Data taken from: Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1924;
Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1925; Eidgenössische
Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1926; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik
des Warenverkehrs 1927.
37 Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1924; Eidgenössische
Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1925; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik
des Warenverkehrs 1926; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1927.
38 Kästli, “Zur wirtschaftlichen Erschliessung Chinas. Der Uhrenmarkt in China,” April 30, 1923,
BAR E 2300 1000/716_431.
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the level of 1924 again in 1927 (see Figure 3). The negligible impact that trade with China
had on the Swiss economy in the 1920s is at odds with the importance that the Swiss
government and the Swiss consulate in Shanghai accorded to commercial interests in
China whenever they discussed Swiss China policies. Even more interestingly, however,
the media completely ignored this aspect, as the next section shows.
III. Commercial interests and extraterritoriality in media portrayals
For the analysis of the media’s description of Swiss interests in China, publications
were selected that represent a variety of socioeconomic profiles in their readerships.
They were also among the publications with the highest circulation in order to ensure
that they represent widespread views and media discourse. The following publications
were analyzed: NZZ (a liberal newspaper from Zurich with national circulation),
Tages-Anzeiger (a newspaper with an officially neutral, general readership from
Zurich also with national circulation), Gazette de Lausanne (a liberal–democrat news-
paper from Lausanne), Journal de Genève (a liberal newspaper from Geneva), Luzerner
Tagblatt (a conservative newspaper from Lucerne), Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung (a
weekly publication with general readership and national circulation), and Nebelspalter
(a satirical magazine with national circulation). In 1925, the events in China were not
covered in great detail in the Swiss press. Instead, the foreign news section of Swiss
newspapers covered primarily events in European countries as well as international
events like the negotiations at Locarno.40 In 1927, events in China received much more
media attention than in the previous years.41 However, the framing of the events in
China did not change between 1925 and 1927.
In the 1920s, Swiss newspapers had no foreign correspondents in China. The only
newspaper with a contact in China who constantly supplied articles was the Journal de
Figure 3. Swiss imports from China in Swiss francs, 1923–1927.39
39 Data taken from: Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1923;
Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1924; Eidgenössische
Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1925; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik
des Warenverkehrs 1926; Eidgenössische Oberzolldirektion, Statistik des Warenverkehrs 1927.
40 Kamber, “Medienereignishierarchien,” 374.
41 Ibid., 376.
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Genève, which printed articles from Philippe de Vargas who taught history and ecclesias-
tical history at Yenching University in Beijing.42 All publications predominantly relied on
British newspapers and the news agencies Reuters and Havas. British press portrayals of
the antiforeign agitation in China were influenced by three factors: firstly, the fact that
British trade with China suffered tremendously from the antiforeign agitation; secondly,
the effects of anticommunist hysteria in Britain; and thirdly, the conservative nature of
most British newspapers. As a result, a majority of the British press portrayed events in
China as having been orchestrated by the Soviet Union or the Comintern with the aim of
weakening Britain’s position in China.43
Many Swiss newspapers explicitly distanced themselves from this view and stated that
nationalism was more important than Bolshevist agitation as the driving force behind the
movement.44 While newspapers like the Tages-Anzeiger or the NZZ outright rejected the
notion of Soviet responsibility, commentaries in the Journal de Genève and particularly
the Gazette de Lausanne did so less vehemently.45 This can be explained by the fact that
anticommunism was stronger in the French-speaking part of Switzerland because of the
presence of anticommunist patriotic organizations and because many Russians had emi-
grated there after the October Revolution and were vocal in their hostility towards
Communism.46 The right-wing hardliner Maurice Muret, for example, regularly wrote
in the Gazette de Lausanne about the events in China. In one of his articles, he warned his
readers of the consequences of a Communist China: “A Bolshevik and anti-Christian
China would constitute an extremely grave menace for the Occident and occidental
civilization.”47
Nevertheless, even publications that relied on the Red Menace to portray events in
China also used other frames. While many newspapers and magazines argued that the
antiforeign incidents were a result of the civil war raging in China and that they would not
have happened otherwise,48 the dominant frame for the antiforeign agitation was anti-
imperialism. A typical view was the Tages-Anzeiger’s argument in March 1927 that the
real cause of the antiforeign sentiment in China was the policy of the imperial powers.49
The Luzerner Tagblatt, in turn, accused the foreigners in China of having lost “moral and
judicial responsibility” because they had lived for such a long time with the privileges
granted in the unequal treaties,50 and it expressed sympathy for the movement because of
the appalling working conditions in Chinese textile factories and mines.51 Philippe de
Vargas also dedicated various articles in the Journal de Genève to the unequal treaties as
the cause of the May Thirtieth Movement. In a long article he listed paragraph after
paragraph of examples showing how the privileges enjoyed by the foreign powers
exploited China’s political and legal system as well as its economy and society. He
concluded:
42 Ziehr, “Vargas,” vol. 6, 416.
43 Knüsel, “British Conservatives,” 62–92.
44 Journal de Genève, June 17, 1925, July 3, 1925; NZZ, June 7, 10, 11, 21, 27, 1925, March 26,
1927; Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung, July 9, 1925; Tages-Anzeiger, June 10, 1925, March 23, 1927,
June 11, 1925, June 21, 1925, July 27, 1925; and Luzerner Tagblatt, June 13, 1925, July 11, 1925.
45 See for example Journal de Genève, June 26, 1925 and July 4, 1925.
46 Dreyer, Schweizer Kreuz und Sowjetstern, 92.
47Gazette de Lausanne, July 28, 1925; see also June 9, 15, 25, 1925, July 6, 28, 1925.
48NZZ, April 21, 1927; Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung, February 17, 1927, April 1, 1927, April 14,
1927, April 21, 1927; Journal de Genève, June 18, 1925; and Tages-Anzeiger, April 7, 1927.
49 Tages-Anzeiger, March 23, 1927.
50 Luzerner Tagblatt, June 13, 1925.
51 Ibid., July 11, 1925.
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Of course, the Russians are doing everything they can to develop the situation to their profit.
On the other hand, it is also very natural that all commercial and industrial interests that thrive
because of the privileged situation of foreigners are trying to foment European public opinion
by crying Bolshevik wolf. But this is to be blind to the real situation… which is the result of
an erroneous policy of an entire century and a superiority complex of the white race which is
neither justified by the precepts of Christianity nor by the teachings of history.52
Various newspapers also argued that the antiforeign movement was in fact a nationalist
movement.53 The Luzerner Tagblatt printed several articles in which it described the
different aspects of informal imperialism in China and stated: “the smallest microstate
would not tolerate foreign meddling in domestic affairs anymore the way the largest
empire of the world is still tolerating it.”54 The most vigorous denunciation of imperialism
in China, however, was published in the Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung: “Like the indi-
genous population in India and North Africa, the country [China] is struggling to liberate
itself from the oppressing slave chains of the white powers.”55 The choice of vocabulary
is very interesting here. The magazine defined the perpetrators as “the white powers,” but
by 1925 Japan was the most dominant foreign power in China, not least in terms of
foreign nationals and businesses. The description of informal imperialism in China as
“oppressing slave chains” also shows that the magazine wanted to take a stand against
imperialism rather than just analyze the situation in China.
Between 1925 and 1927, Swiss publications overwhelmingly showed great sympathy
for the antiforeign movement in China. The following excerpt from the NZZ shows how
this was connected to criticism of the behavior of foreign powers in China:
The Chinese have experienced often enough that one cannot achieve much with a gentle
manner. As long as the foreign powers did not feel a strong pressure or even threats, they
showed no hurry whatsoever in granting even the most pressing Chinese demands, which had
been acknowledged as justified by everybody. Thus, they have trifled away any entitlement
for patience.56
Between 1925 and 1927 the magazine Nebelspalter printed various cartoons and texts
that commented gleefully on the antiforeign movement in China, often making fun of
the situation of businessmen in China.57 One such cartoon was entitled “Driving the
foreigners out of China” (Figure 4).58 It depicts three white men wearing suits and top
hats being blown away from China. The caption below the illustration states: “Dear
God, we did not expect such a headwind.” The three men are wearing the attire of
businessmen, and their pockets seem to be full of money, which is implied by the
various bills that are floating around them. Their interest in China is, therefore, por-
trayed as strictly commercial. Moreover, the sarcastic tone of the cartoon is clearly
mocking the failure of Western businessmen in China.
In light of the media’s awareness of the complicity of foreign businessmen in informal
imperialism in China, it is interesting that Swiss trade with China was not discussed by Swiss
52 Journal de Genève, June 24, 1925; see also July 30, 1924.
53Gazette de Lausanne, June 20, 1925; NZZ, June 10, 21, 1925, July 5, 1925, March 22, 1927;
Luzerner Tagblatt, July 11, 13, 1925; Tages-Anzeiger, June 29, 1925; and Journal de Genève, July
3, 1925.
54 Luzerner Tagblatt, June 6, 1925 and July 11, 1925 (quote).
55 Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung, June 18, 1925.
56NZZ, March 22, 1927.
57Nebelspalter, August 7, 1925, April 29, 1927, March 15, 1927, June 17, 1927.
58 Peter Bachmann, “Driving the foreigners out of China”.
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publications, despite the May Thirtieth Movement’s effects on Swiss trade with China and the
importance the Swiss government attributed to commercial interests in China. It is also
remarkable that the Swiss press ignored the fact that Switzerland was among the countries
that had been granted the most-favored-nation clause, and that Swiss citizens and businesses
in China profited from the privileges that were granted to Switzerland because of this clause.
Instead, most publications gave the impression that Switzerland had no interests in China
whatsoever. The exception was the Tages-Anzeiger, which stated in an article that Swiss
nationals in China had been entitled to extraterritoriality since 1918 and explained in detail
what this actually meant. The newspaper then reminded its readers that the events in China
and their effects on extraterritoriality should be of interest to Switzerland as well.59 Yet, the
Tages-Anzeiger also stated in another article: “It is quite a relief for Switzerland that the
Chinese bear no hatred for our compatriots.”60 The view that Switzerland was not part of the
foreign presence in China can also be seen in various articles where publications described the
May ThirtiethMovement as a struggle in which China was fighting against Britain, the United
States, Japan, and the Soviet Union.61 Switzerland did not figure in these portrayals as one of
the foreign powers.
Figure 4. “Driving the foreigners out of China” by Peter Bachmann, Nebelspalter (April 29, 1927).
59 Tages-Anzeiger, June 22, 1925.
60 Ibid., June 26, 1925.
61NZZ, July 31, 1925 and March 22, 1927; Tages-Anzeiger, June 29, 1925; and Nebelspalter,
November 27, 1925 and May 13, 1927.
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It is extremely puzzling that the press did not regard Switzerland as part of the powers
complicit in informal imperialism in China. The explanation that Switzerland was unique
among the foreign powers in China because it had no sphere of interest is invalid because
countries like the United States did not have a sphere of influence either. The 429 Swiss
citizens who lived in China in 1925 were part of the foreign community in China, which
was protected by extraterritoriality and whose businesses profited from the same low taxes
and duties as all the other foreign powers. They lived in foreign concessions and were
protected by foreign police. The Swiss expatriates in China joined foreign clubs in the
expat communities and some even participated in the volunteer corps that defended the
French Concession in Shanghai in 1927.62
The negative portrayal of extraterritoriality by the Swiss press and the denunciation of
other nations that were unwilling to abolish it is also hypocritical when one keeps in mind
that Switzerland was the last country to be granted extraterritorial privileges by China in
191863 and one of the last European countries that agreed to relinquish it in 1946.64
Extraterritoriality was clearly of much greater importance to the Swiss government and
Swiss expatriates in China than Swiss newspapers sought to make their readers believe.
This raises the question of why Swiss editors so adamantly downplayed the issue.
IV. National narratives and media portrayals of China
The fact that so many Swiss magazines and newspapers used the antiforeign agitation in
China to criticize foreign imperialism in China is perplexing because of Switzerland’s
participation in it. Moreover, using imperialism to frame the stories about the events in
China required the suppression of any accounts about the involvement of Swiss compa-
nies in the transnational networks that participated in informal imperialism in China. This
was easier in the 1920s than before the First World War.
As Christof Dejung and Andreas Zangger have pointed out, until the early twen-
tieth century, the nationality of global business companies was of very little impor-
tance because free trade dominated international commerce. During this “period of
economic cosmopolitanism,”65 Swiss trading companies in Asia not only had trading
partners from various other countries, but employees of the multinational trading
houses also had diverse national backgrounds. Swiss merchant houses built trading
networks across Asia and were able to establish quite a strong presence in the import
and export business in Asia.66 Swiss participation in the transnational imperial net-
works of commerce and trade meant that even though Switzerland did not possess
colonies, it nevertheless profited from imperial structures and networks.67 Global
economic warfare during the First World War, however, made the nationality of
62 “Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesrates vom 31. März 1927,” March 31, 1927, Commission
nationale pour la publication de Documents Suisses, 489–490; and Woodhead, China Year Book
1928, 4.
63 “Freundschaftsvertrag zwischen der Schweiz und der Republik China,” Bundesblatt 52, no. 5
(1918), 657–659. See also: Zhou, Exterritorialitätsrechte, 20–40, 63–66.
64 Coduri, La Suisse, 50–53.
65 Dejung and Zangger, “British Wartime Protectionism,” 182.
66 Ibid., 181–213. For an overview of the historiography, see Dejung, “Unbekannte Intermediäre,”
139–142. For the development of Swiss trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see
Iselin, Lüthi, and Sebastian, Der schweizerische Grosshandel, 104–135.
67 David and Etemad, “Gibt es einen schweizerischen Imperialismus?” 19–21. For Swiss economic
opportunism in different locations, see Stucki, Das heimliche Imperium; and Witschi, Schweizer auf
imperialistischen Pfaden.
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businesses much more important.68 It is, therefore, possible that the Swiss press did
not view Swiss businesses in China as part of an imperial network of commerce but as
nationally distinctive business entities, which were not complicit in any transnational
imperial networks.
This perception was helped by the small role that trade with China played in the Swiss
economy. Swiss exports went mostly to European nations in the early twentieth century.69
Moreover, in 1925 there were only 25 Swiss companies in China.70 As a result, Swiss
editors might not have regarded commercial interests as crucial because trade with China
was insignificant compared to Swiss trade with European countries. This view is corro-
borated by an article that was published in the NZZ, in which an Italian observer was
described as being capable of evaluating the situation in the Far East absolutely objec-
tively because Italy had only very limited interests in China.71 Consequently, it could be
argued that the level of economic interests in China was seen as decisive in whether or not
a country was a good or a bad foreign power in China.
Yet, the question still remains as to why there was such an enormous discrepancy
between official and media perceptions of Switzerland’s participation in informal imperi-
alism in China. The following paragraphs will demonstrate that Switzerland’s participa-
tion in the unequal treaties clashed with traditional portrayals of Swiss values while anti-
imperialism dovetailed with some of the most important values in the discursive con-
struction of nationhood, namely democracy and neutrality.
Swiss criticism of the foreign powers’ presence in China often focused on the absence
of democracy in China, particularly the situation in Shanghai, as the following excerpt
from the NZZ demonstrates:
Nobody will deny that a patriotic Chinese is justified in complaining that he is not in control
of his own house, when in about twenty important seaports, it is foreign powers that really
exercise government. Is there any wonder that the situation in Shanghai, for example, seems
quite abnormal and unbearable to a Chinese when he sees that in this city, in which only
21,000 foreigners live next to half a million of Chinese, the government of the business
quarter is really in the hands of six English, one Japanese, and two Americans? To a democrat
as well as a nationalist, it has to be an open contradiction of the two most important basic
principles of political justice that an industrial community like Shanghai is governed in this
way by a comparatively small body of foreign taxpayers.72
The article not only criticized the foreign concessions and the SMC as undemocratic, it
also portrayed Swiss readers as democrats and nationalists, implying that the situation in
China was contrary to Swiss values and behavior.
Unlike other national mythologies, Swiss national mythology does not center on a
story of solidarity and nationalism caused by a shared ethnicity, language, or religion,
because Switzerland is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse. Instead, Swiss
national mythology focuses on stories in which the Swiss Confederacy is threatened from
the outside, forcing the Confederates to stick together and fight the foreign enemy. The
Confederates are, thus, presented as a community of patriotic peasants and shepherds who
courageously fought their foreign lords in order to form an independent, democratic
68 Dejung and Zangger, “British Wartime Protectionism.”
69 Bairoch, “La Suisse,” 105–108; and Tanner, “Die Schweiz und Europa,” 409–410.
70 Woodhead, China Year Book 1928, 4.
71NZZ, July 9, 1925.
72NZZ, July 5, 1925. See also Journal de Genève, July 13, 1925 and March 25, 1927; and NZZ,
March 22, 1927.
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nation. The founding myth of Switzerland is the Rütlischwur, an oath that was supposedly
taken in 1291 by three delegates from Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden on the meadow
Rütli, where they swore loyalty to each other and promised to fight together against their
overlords until they were free.73 Similarly, Swiss national mythology celebrates heroes
like Wilhelm Tell and Winkelried who personified Swiss opposition to foreign dominance
and Switzerland’s struggle for humanity and good against evil. Resistance against a
foreign oppressor and the struggle for freedom were (and still are), therefore, central in
nationalist discourse.74 As the Confederates were widely used in political arguments and
national portrayals in the early twentieth century,75 newspaper articles presenting the
Chinese as resisting foreign oppression in the 1920s would have elicited strong sympathy
among Swiss readers, whereas stories about Swiss involvement in imperialism would
probably have caused a public outcry and could even have led to public pressure on the
Swiss government to give up extraterritoriality in China.
Switzerland’s conspicuous absence from the media’s description of the imperial
presence in China can also be explained by the importance of neutrality for the discursive
construction of Swiss nationhood. Switzerland’s small size, its important strategic location
in Europe, and the various languages spoken there caused anxieties that Switzerland could
be absorbed by another European power. Neutrality became the basis of Swiss foreign
policy in 1815 and was commonly regarded as the main reason Switzerland had managed
to remain a sovereign nation, particularly during the First World War. In the 1920s,
neutrality occupied a central role in discursive constructs of Swiss national identity.76 In
1920, for example, a plebiscite was held on whether or not Switzerland should join the
League of Nations. The debate surrounding the plebiscite centered on the image of
Switzerland as the promoter of peace among nations and on Swiss neutrality.77 The
Federal Government coined the concept of a “differential neutrality” to claim that
Switzerland could join the League of Nations without compromising Swiss neutrality.
However, opponents of Swiss membership in the League of Nations argued that it would
compromise Swiss neutrality. They also warned that it would mark the end of
Switzerland’s military and political independence.78 The heated debate surrounding the
true nature of Swiss neutrality shows how important neutrality was for the concept of
Swiss nationhood.
As a neutral country, Switzerland could not embark on colonial adventures. While the
Swiss government had no qualms about obtaining extraterritoriality in China and thereby
joining the signatory powers of the unequal treaties, the open endorsement of the unequal
treaties or stories about Swiss complicity in informal imperialism in China were tricky
issues that had to be handled with care by the media. The Swiss press tried to alleviate any
suspicions some readers might have had about Switzerland’s responsibility for or even
culpability in the situation in China by focusing on neutrality. For example, the Tages-
Anzeiger declared:
73 Kreis, Mythos Rütli; and Sablonier, Gründungszeit ohne Eidgenossen.
74 Wild, “Auf wen schoss Wilhelm Tell,” 25–27; Imhof, “Sonderfallsdiskurse und Pfadabhängigkeit,”
29–36.
75 Marchal, Schweizer Gebrauchsgeschichte, 130–131.
76 Widmer, Die Schweiz als Sonderfall, 134–141; Bonjour, “Geschichte der schweizerischen
Aussenpolitik,” 57–80; Rapold, Der Schweizerische Generalstab, 19–26, 121–180; Mittler, Der
Weg zum Ersten Weltkrieg, 719–763; Kaestli, Selbstbezogenheit und Offenheit, 34–35; Langendorf
and Streit, Face à la guerre, 132–138; and Im Hof, Mythos Schweiz, 184–185.
77 Moos, “Ein Aufbruch,” 48.
78 Ibid., 50–55; and Kaestli, Selbstbezogenheit und Offenheit, 111–115, 121–124.
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A general hatred of foreigners in China would have to develop before our compatriots could
get hurt. The Swiss as citizens of a neutral microstate do not stand in the same relationship to
China as the citizens of several major powers and therefore already have less at risk.79
Although the Tages-Anzeiger inadvertently admitted involvement of Swiss nationals in the
imperial networks in China, it used neutrality and Switzerland’s small size to absolve
Switzerland of any shameful collaboration with imperial powers and ignored the fact that
Swiss nationals enjoyed the same privileges as nationals from the imperial nations. This
view was also supported by the fact that no Swiss citizens were injured or killed in the
disturbances.80 Thus, references to Swiss commercial relations with China and their
dependence upon Switzerland’s legal status in China as a power with extraterritorial
privileges were suppressed by the Swiss press because they would have contradicted
the dominant national discourses of Swiss nationhood.
V. Conclusion
This article has analyzed the discrepancy between official and media perceptions in
Switzerland in the 1920s of informal imperialism in China. It has shown that commercial
relations were a crucial factor in those perceptions. Official relations with China in the
1920s were dominated by Switzerland’s status as a treaty power and resulted in China’s
demands for treaty negotiation and Switzerland’s refusal to negotiate. From the start,
official relations were dominated by commercial interests. A Swiss mission was estab-
lished in China because it was thought that this would improve Swiss trade with China.
Both Swiss officials and business organizations were convinced that privileges such as
extraterritoriality were crucial for Swiss trade with China. By the 1920s, Swiss merchants
and companies were not only deeply immersed in the transnational commercial networks
in China, but were also affected by events in China and participated socially as part of the
colonial elite in China’s treaty ports. Commercial relations with China were, therefore,
deeply rooted in the social, economic, and political structures and processes created by
informal imperialism in China.
Media reactions to the antiforeign agitation in China are interesting because Swiss
newspapers and magazines across the political spectrum passionately criticized imperial-
ism in China, particularly extraterritoriality and the system of foreign concessions, but
they almost completely ignored Swiss participation in informal imperialism. Possible
explanations for this reaction are the negligible importance attributed to Swiss trade
with China and the increasing focus on the nationality of foreign companies in China
rather than their transnational nature. However, national discourses were also crucial to
this reaction because Swiss national mythology was based on anti-imperial narratives.
Thus, press articles about Swiss participation in informal imperialism in China via
privileges like extraterritoriality would have challenged traditional self-images of the
Swiss as an inherently democratic and neutral nation. As any newspaper article about
the nature of Swiss business in China would inevitably have included information about
Switzerland’s status as a treaty power in China and the fact that Swiss nationals enjoyed
the same privileges as other nationals of treaty powers, Swiss complicity in informal
imperialism could only be downplayed if Swiss commercial relations with China were
completely ignored. This had the ironic consequence that, despite their insignificance for
79 Tages-Anzeiger, June 26, 1925.
80NZZ, June 26, 1925.
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overall Swiss trade, commercial relations with China were a very tricky business in the
1920s.
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